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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) drafting
and revision processes are under siege; critics of the Code's for-
mulation of fundamental rules and principles are attacking the
conventions of the sponsors of the uniform commercial law and
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reflect the views of the ALI, ABA, AALS, or AIAM. The Authors are grateful to
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the deliberations of the study and drafting committees charged
with modernizing the commercial law' This Article responds
to the indictment leveled by two particularly influential crit-
ics-Dean Robert E. Scott2 and Professor Alan Schwartz3-- as
their work relates to the current project to revise Article 9 of
the Code concerning "Secured Transactions"--loans against
collateral.4
While the Uniform Commercial Code drafting and revision
processes may be flawed, obscuring deficiencies in the status quo
by discovering "false positives" frustrates rather than serves the
crucial goal of accomplishing meaningful reform. Ultimately,
commentators who misidentify deficiencies mask real shortcom-
ings and, in fact, may exacerbate the problems of the current
system.
Each of the Authors has been involved in Uniform Commer-
cial Code drafting and revision projects over the course of the
last fifteen years.5 The actors and entities responsible for main-
taining the integrity of the system have not conspired to formu-
late rules that perpetrate injustice. In fact, a trend seems to
have arisen toward greater balance in the commercial law than
has ever before been realized in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
1. See, e.g., Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or
Who Is Saving the UCC?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, Inter-
est Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from
the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Donald J. Rapson, Who
Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in
the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249
(1994); Edward L. Rubm, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743
(1993).
2. Dean, Lewis F Powell, Jr., Professor of Law, and Arnold H. Leon Professor of
Law, University of Virginia.
3. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
4. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legisla-
tures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80
VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
5. The Authors are members of the ALI and the ABA and have participated in
those groups' deliberations concerning revision of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Professor Alces was the Chair of the ABA Task Force studying the Article 9 Filing
System. Professor Frisch is the ABA's advisor to the Article 2 Revision Committee.
As counsel to the AJAM, Professor Alces has attended the meetings of the Article 2
Revision Committee.
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Tins Article takes account of the forces that shape revisions of
the commercial law and notes the relationship between those
forces and the tenor of the resulting codification; Part II peruses
Scott's thesis. It responds to his criticism of the UCC drafting
and revision processes and describes how uniform commercial
law jurisprudence reveals the incongruities in his analysis. Part
III tests Scott's conclusions about private legislatures' by con-
sidering the realist jurisprudence of the UCC and compares the
UCC's "private legislature" (PL) commercial law to the commer-
cial-law product of a "public legislature," the Bankruptcy Code
promulgated by the United States Congress. Part IV focuses on
the aspects of the Article 9 revision that Scott used to illus-
trate the operation of the Schwartz and Scott thesis-the filing
system, purchase money security interests, and proceeds of
collateral.'
II. THE SCOTT THESIS IN A NUTSHELL
Scott argues that special interests dominate uniform commer-
cial law revision because the process lacks the system of checks
and balances provided by public legislatures! Revision efforts
therefore develop commercial law that serves those special inter-
ests at the expense of constituencies impotent to protect their
rights.9 Scott endeavors to substantiate his criticism of the pr-
vate legislatures that compose the Uniform Commercial Code by
reviewing the draft provisions of revised Article 9, specifically
the sections that provide "Rules That Advantage Financing In-
siders"" and Article 9 filing system rules "That Advantage Less
Informed Creditors."' According to Scott, the measure of UCC
6. Scott, supra note 4, at 1810-22.
7. Id. at 1829-38.
8. Because Article 9 regulates asset-based financers, a paradigmatic example
of well-organized and cohesive interests, the process is susceptible to
disproportionate influence by a single active interest group representing
particular financing interests. In such a case, I suggest that the law
revision process will tend to propose rules that are both transactionally
efficient and distributionally favorable to the dominating interests.
Id. at 1850.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1795.
ii. Id. at 1799.
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drafting inequity is the extent to which those two sections vindi-
cate special interests at the expense of parties who would be
better represented in a public legislature." This section will
first treat the premises supporting Scott's critique of the private
legislature model of UCC revision.
A. "Logrolling Is Very Difficult""
Scott describes "logrolling" as the practice of legislators' trad-
ing one legislative provision for another. 4 For example, in a
public legislature, a representative from a tobacco state might
agree to support public transportation funding for a state with a
concentrated urban population in return for the urban
legislator's promise to vote against increased cigarette taxes.
Logrolling makes no claim to moral superiority over other ways
of reaching an agreement, but it does provide a means of getting
things done. Scott argues that the private legislators involved in
UCC drafting processes "cannot typically resolve disputes by
agreeing to trade one Article 9 provision for another." 5 He
does acknowledge, however, the possibility of trade-offs within
particular provisions. 6
Scott's description of this type of "trade" does not address the
fairness of the rule that results from a regime with no, or less,
logrolling. Logrolling in public legislatures may serve the inter-
ests of legislators by pleasing the constituencies that will vote
to keep them in office but may do little or perhaps nothing to
improve the broader society A net societal loss might well re-
sult if Virginia farmers grow and sell more tobacco, even though
New York obtains funding for public transportation projects.
Assuming that the transportation funding is a good idea, it is
difficult to see why more people should die of cancer at substan-
tial cost to nonsmokers so that New York can obtain that fund-
ing. Indeed, if that type of quid pro quo is the hallmark of a
12. See id. at 1830-31.
13. Id. at 1812.
14. Id.
15. Id. The history of commercial-law drafting, if it proves anything, proves that
the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) do get things done.
16. Id.
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public legislature, the UCC private legislature model might well
be preferable.17
Even assuming that logrolling improves the legislative pro-
cess, consider Scott's conclusion, without citation of any authori-
ty whatsoever, that private legislators will make trades within
provisions but will not trade one provision for another." That
matter of form should not determine substance. For example,
under Scott's pessimistic view of special interests, would not a
manufacturer of goods for ultimate sale to consumers be inclined
to trade the scope of warranty protection for the substance of
warranty protection? That is, if the warranty section says that
buyers may recover consequential damages from sellers upon
certain types of breach, why would an adjustment to the warran-
ty disclaimer provisions not vindicate seller interests?
Scott's arguments in support of his logrolling conclusion are
not convincing. He suggests that study group members work on
discrete projects and are not in a position to trade, for example,
a sales provision for a secured transactions provision: "Study
groups are asked to draft single projects and are dismissed when
the projects are completed." 9 In fact, many of the same people
are active m more than one UCC revision project, either as
members of study committees or as participants in the open
drafting committee meetings." Of course, that degree of partici-
pation does not necessarily guarantee more balanced legislation,
but it does ensure that the attorney arguing for a particular
provision in one enactment is considerate of that provision's
17. For a comparison of the congressional lawmaking process with the NCCUSL
model, see Carlyle C. Ring, The UCC Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 LOy. L.A.
L. REv. 287, 305-07 (1994).
18. Scott, supra note 4, at 1812.
19. Id.
20. Because the NCCUSL and the ALI concern themselves with more than just
the commercial law, not all of the members of those groups are active in the com-
mercial-law projects. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 600-02 (describing the
makeup and procedures of the ALI and NCCUSL); see also HANDBOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-EIGHTH YEAR 35-50
(William S. Hem & Co. 1994) (listing members of all of NCCUSL's special com-
mittees). Therefore, a limited number of NCCUSL commissioners and AIl members
have a particular interest in the UCC and comprise either the drafting or advisory
committees.
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cooperation with parallel provisions. While an actual "trade"
may not occur-for example, the exchange of-a commercial inter-
est provision for a consumer interest section in a different arti-
cle-more coordination exists between parallel enactments than
Scott acknowledges.2i
Scott's most glaring error with regard to the composition of
drafting committees relates to the expertise of the committee
members: "Drafting committee members, however, are chosen
because they are 'experts,' not because they represent the larger
bodies, and the larger bodies have almost no voice in selecting
the committee members or the reporters."22 Of course, it would
be curious indeed if the members of legislative drafting commit-
tees were selected for their ignorance rather than for their gen-
eral familiarity with the commercial law 2 Further reason ex-
ists, however, to consider skeptically Scott's observations.
The members of the Uniform Commercial Code drafting com-
mittees are selected from the membership of the NCCUSL, an
organization comprised of political appointees.' Evidence sug-
21. To a considerable extent, this coordination results from a blurring of the lines
that distinguish the scope of parallel commercial enactments. For example, although
Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sale of goods, Article 2A applies to leases of
personal property. Many of the provisions in the two articles track one another, and
the comments to Article 2A acknowledge when it departs from the sales law formu-
lation of a rule to conform Article 2A with leasing practices. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-
201 cmt. (1994):
Changes: This section is modeled on Section 2-201, with changes to re-
flect the differences between a lease contract and a contract for the sale
of goods. In particular, subsection (1)(b) adds a requirement that the
writing "describe the goods leased and the lease term," borrowing that
concept, with revisions, from the provisions of Section 9-203(1)(a). Subsec-
tion (2), relying on the statutory analogue in Section 9-110, sets forth the
minimum criterion for satisfying that requirement.
Id. This comment also reveals the relationship among the sales, lease, and personal
property security regimes of the UCC. Further, the commentary to other Article 2A
provisions concerning consumer protection cites analogous Uniform Consumer Credit
Code provisions. See, e.g., id. §§ 2A-108 to -109.
22. Scott, supra note 4, at 1812-13.
23. For a discussion of the benefits of expertise m the drafting of commercial
legislation, see Ring, supra note 17, at 306-07.
24. Scott, supra note 4, at 1805. Dean Scott erroneously asserts that the more
than 300 Commissioners that comprise the NCCUSL are "appointed on a nonpolitical
basis." Id. at 1804. Insofar as elected political officials in the states, most often the
governors, appoint the commissioners, no reason exists for believing that the same
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gests that the members of the drafting committees are selected,
to an extent, on the basis of the geographic diversity that they
will bring to the project.' That selection criterion is crucial to
the enactment effort once the project is finished. Legislatures in
the different regions of the country are more likely to enact
legislation bearing the imprimatur of drafters who have their
region's parochial interests in mind.
In addition, Scott is not completely accurate when he says
that the members of the drafting committees are experts. The
members of the drafting committees for Articles 2 and 9 are not
the leading sales and secured transactions attorneys in the coun-
try To a considerable extent, they are representatives of differ-
ent legal perspectives rather than leading commercial-law schol-
ars."6 The membership of these committees was set when Scott
wrote his article, but he offers no concrete examples to support
his inaccurate generalizations.
B. "PL Members Act As Individuals and Have No Independent
Political Power"'2
Scott points out that the NCCUSL and the ALI are not politi-
cal organizations in the partisan sense." He concludes, there-
fore, that the ALI and the NCCUSL "need interest group sup-
port, or at least the absence of interest group opposition, to en-
political considerations that drive gubernatorial appointments generally do not dictate
these appointments. Dean Scott offered no support, anecdotal or otherwise, for his
assertion that officials make these political appointments on a nonpolitical basis.
25. For example, consider the geographic diversity of the members of the Article 9
Revision Committee: William M. Burke, Chair, California; William S. Arnold, Arkan-
sas; Manon Benfield, California; Trudi Bird, Connecticut; Dale G. Higer, Idaho; Wil-
liam C. Hillman, Massachusetts; Randal C. Picker, Illinois; Donald J. Rapson, New
Jersey; Harry C. Sigman, California; Bradley Y. Smith, New York; Edwin E. Smith,
Massachusetts; Sandra S. Stem, New York; Steven L. Harris, Reporter, Illinois;
Charles W Mooney, Reporter, Pennsylvania. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNI-
FORM COMSIERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9. PARTS 4 AND 5 (WITH CONFORMING AND
MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 1-102, 9-105, AND 9-318) (Draft, Feb. 10,
1995).
26. On the Article 2 Committee, for example, Comnssioner Langrock frequently
raises issues of concern to trial lawyers, and Professor Spanogle is an international
business law scholar.
27. Scott, supra note 4, at 1813.
28. Id.
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sure the passage of their proposals by state legislators."29 That
observation certainly is accurate and is borne out by UCC expe-
rence, particularly in the case of enactments that would order
the rights of strong constituencies versus the interests of weaker
groups.3 1 Strong and well-orgamzed interest groups, such as
banks, would be in a position to block state enactment of com-
mercial legislation perceived as too indulgent of the rights of
less orgamzed and, therefore, less powerful interest groups, such
as consumers and small business interests.3 '
This asymmetry between the influence of groups on opposite
sides of the debate over commercial legislation has frustrated
the uniform commercial law from the time of Karl Llewellyn's
vision of the UCC.32 That the NCCUSL and the ALI have done
any worse job in adjusting for that asymmetry than have more
"political" institutions, such as the United States Congress, is
not at all clear.3 Such a comparison is the test of the UCC
drafting process.
C. "There Are Informatin Asymmetries Between PL Committees
and Study Groups and the Membership at Large'
According to Scott, the members of the NCCUSL and ALI
drafting committees are "experts" in the area of law that is the
subject of the committees' deliberations. 35 That conclusion is
29. Id. at 1813-14.
30. Consider, in this regard, the conclusions of Professors Beutel and Gilmore with
regard to the original Article 4 of the UCC. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uni-
form [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 361-62 (1952)
(claiming that Article 4 "was drafted entirely with the purpose of protecting the
banks so that they could carry on their business at the risk of the customer" and
calling it "a deliberate sell-out to the bank lobby"); Grant Gilmore, The Uniform
Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 376 (1952) (arguing
that "[s]ection 4-103 goes far beyond what is wise or permissible in allowing banks
to rewrite the law their way whenever things get tough").
31. See Beutel, supra note 30; Gilmore, supra note 30.
32. For a description of and commentary on Llewellyn's involvement in the draft-
ing of the UCC, see Eugene F Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New
Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV.
213 (1966).
33. See infra part III.B.
34. Scott, supra note 4, at 1814.
35. Id., see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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something of an overstatement and, as well, is misleading in its
construction of the term "expertise." Scott also states that be-
cause the members of the private legislatures of the ALI and the
NCCUSL know little about the subject matter of the drafting
committees' work, they are at the mercy of the members of the
drafting committee and cannot reach informed conclusions on
their own. 6
Scott does not cite the composition of any particular drafting
committee to support this portion of his critique. If he had
considered carefully the membership of particular drafting com-
mittees, he likely would have found a combination of experts on
discrete subtopics within the scope of the drafting projects and
generalists familiar with a majority of the legal contexts affected
by the draft law He also would have found that both the ALI
and NCCUSL committees included members with no particular
expertise in the subject matter of the draft. 8 Presumably, they
are appointed because they serve as effective bellwethers to
indicate the strategic strong points of the draft not immediately
accessible to the sponsoring organizations' membership-at-large.
Semority does not determine the membership of the drafting
committees, although effective service on other committees does
matter. Why membership based on representation of an interest
group-certainly the case with congressional committees-would
yield better, more balanced law than would membership based
on the criteria applied by the ALI and the NCCUSL is not im-
mediately clear.
Scott concludes that the members of a PL "unlike members of
a typical legislature have little incentive to become more
educated before voting."39 That assertion follows from Scott's
observation that
the typical uninformed PL member seeks to maximize the
36. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1814 ("[The median PL member knows little about
the subject matter of any particular drafting project.").
37. See id. at 1814-15.
38. The Reporter for the original Article 3 of the UCC, Professor William Prosser,
was appointed to that position precisely because he would not bring any biases to
the process. Soia Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 537, 542
(1982). He was a torts scholar and not an expert in commercial paper law. Id.
39. Scott, supra note 4, at 1814.
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public good (as she conceives of it) subject to several con-
straints: (1) that her private mterest-for example, her law
practice-is not directly unpaired; (2) that her reputation for
good judgment is not impaired; and (3) that she spends little
tune on PL busmess.0
The result of that state of affairs, Scott asserts, is model law
consistent with the position of the most promnnent interest
group.4 Alternatively, when competition exists between two
influential interest groups, either maintenance of the status quo
or an accommodation of the conflicting positions may result.42
Scott reaches those conclusions without reference to any particu-
lar issue, controversial or otherwise, treated on the floor of the
annual meetings of the ALI or the NCCUSL. In fact, Scott's
description of the process is not consistent with the Authors'
impressions of both groups' annual meetings. Members who take
issue with a draft's treatment of a matter distribute position
papers, and real, substantial debate takes place concermng the
drafters' accommodation of divergent views.4" The processes as
40. Id. at 1814-15. Scott would do well to heed Carlyle Ring's warning that
it should not be forgotten that ultimately each uniform act must be en-
acted state-by-state, and thus is subjected to review by experts and inter-
ested members of the public in that process. But if the NCCUSL has
done its job well, the commissioners from each state have worked to
make the act suitable for enactment in their state, and recognizing that
uniformity must be a compromise consensus that grows from diversity of
thought and experience, the act should be appropriate for enactment
without amendment.
Ring, supra note 17, at 307.
41. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1790.
42. Id. at 1815.
43. See Harry C. Sigman, Improving the UCC Revision Process: Two Specific Pro-
posals, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 326 n.9 (1994) ("I note with pride that the Califor-
nia Bar UCC Committee delivered to an NCCUSL annual meeting a paper
advocating repeal of Article 6 I believe that paper was highly influential in
persuading the Conference the following year to adopt that proposal."). Carlyle Ring
has observed that:
From its earliest days, the practice of the NCCUSL has been to read
word-by-word every section of the draft and to discuss the draft section-
by-section at a minimum of two annual meetings. For instance, Article
4A was read at three annual meetings, consuming substantial floor time
with questions, comments, and motions from the floor on specific ele-
ments. Similarly, at the annual meeting of the ALI in 1989, the draft
was considered by the full membership of the ALI for their input, ques-
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they are currently constituted are not a panacea, but Scott's
conclusions lack a realistic referent.
D. "Members of the Drafting Committees and Study Groups
Tend To Have Stronger Preferences for Revision Than the
Median PL Member'
Scott asserts that both academicians and the members of
drafting committees, who necessarily, in his view, represent
interest groups, favor revision over maintenance of the status
quo.45 The drafting committee members who represent interest
groups seek legislation that will skew the law in favor of their
constituents, and academics favor revision because it gives them
something to write about, which is, after all, what academics do
for a living.46 The two prongs of that conclusion are fatally
flawed. First, Scott offers no concrete empirical evidence to es-
tablish that members of the drafting committees represent inter-
est groups favoring revision.47 In fact, the interest groups that
would be profoundly affected by any revision of Article 2 neither
have representatives on the drafting committees nor any demon-
strated enthusiasm for revision of Article 2." Further, Scott's
tions, and critique.
Ring, supra note 17, at 298.
44. Scott, supra note 4, at 1815.
45. Id. at 1815-16. Sitting judges also participate as members of drafting commit-
tees. See Ring, supra note 17, at 294. The interest group served by the judiciary is
not clear, and Scott does not make it any clearer.
46. "[Academics] have an institutional commitment to reform because most law
professors earn reputations by writing articles about how the law can be nproved,
rather than by defending the status quo." Scott, supra note 4, at 1816.
47. See id. at 1816-22.
48. The correspondence to the Article 2 Revision Committee from the large manu-
facturing interests has urged the Committee to maintain the status quo and not to
disturb the fundamental commercial practices that have evolved since the promulga-
tion of the original UCC. See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Altier, Vice President &
Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Retail Fed'n, to Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State
Laws (Apr. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Carl Edwards, Jr., Lennox
Int'l Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners of
Uniform State Laws (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Steven C.
Hoffman, Senior Corporate Attorney, Caterpillar, Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive
Secretary, Uniform Law Comm'ners (Dec. 14, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter
from Danel L. Jaffe, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc., to Members of the Conference
(July 24, 1995) (on file with Authors); Letter from Frank T. Judge III, Assistant
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conclusions about the motives of academicians are cymcal. He
fails to appreciate that law teachers can write as much about
what is wrong with the law as they can about revisions of the
law
Despite the deficiencies of his premises, however, Scott's con-
clusion is not off the mark; drafting committees prefer doing
something over doing nothing. That tendency, however, may
well reflect nothing more than their perception of inadequacies
in the current law and an estimation of their ability to improve
the law There is simply no reason to believe that the urge to
reform is a function of interest group pressure or academic ef-
forts to make work.
Notwithstanding his perceptions of interest group and aca-
demic motives, Scott concludes that the outcome of most PL
processes will be a conservative adjustment of the status quo,
unless the members of the drafting committee can convince the
members of the ALI and the NCCUSL that the current law
warrants more aggressive changes.4" That really is a
nonconclusion, in that it says nothing about the PL process that
meamngfully distinguishes it from the public lawmalng pro-
cess. It also does nothing to reveal any inadequacy in the ALI
and the NCCUSL as instruments of commercial-law revision.
Gen. Counsel & Assistant Secretary, Timex Corp., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive
Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 22, 1994) (on
file with Authors); Letter from D.G. Lautz, Semor Counsel, Modine Mfg. Co., to
Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, NaVI Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform
State Laws (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Charles H. Lockwood,
II, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of Int'l Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., to
Members of the Drafting Comm. of UCC Revised Article 2 (Mar. 3, 1995) (on file
with Authors); Letter from George S. Pappayliou, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Tomkins
Indus., Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners
on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Jill Steps,
Gen. Counsel, & Mitch Eisenberg, Attorney, Burndy Corp., to Edith 0. Davies, Exec-
utive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform Laws (Dec. 21, 1994) (on
file with Authors).
49. Scott, supra note 4, at 1816.
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III. TESTING SCOTT'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE PRIVATE
LEGISLATURE AND COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION
From the foregoing premises, Scott concludes that the PL
process is more susceptible to the influence of interest groups
than is the public lawmaking process. 0 Presumably, then, Con-
gress and the state legislatures would devise better commercial
law than do the ALI and the NCCUSL.
A. "Preciswn" in the Uniform Commercial Code
Scott asserts that the way to test for the presence of a domi-
nant interest group and the permcious effects of that group on
the PL process is to look for "precise, clear, bright-line rules" in
the draft legislation. "[Pirecise rules reduce the industry's costs
of compliance with the rules, and, if they are rules that help
the industry, give the interpreters of the rules (i.e., judges) less
ability to read the rule in a way contrary to the industry's
interest."5
Aspects of that argument are, indeed, curious. Certainly, a
dominant interest group will not favor a bright-line rule that
operates in a manner inconsistent with the group's inter-
est-such as a rule that invalidates a disclaimer of liability for
personal injury 52 None of the position papers submitted to the
Article 2 Revision Committee so far, however, objects to that
rule in the current version of Article 2. Further, in certain cir-
cumstances, a dominant interest group will favor a more flexible
standard than that provided by a bright-line rule, as in the case
of the subjective good faith standard in negotiable instruments
law Financial institutions in favor of maintaimng the subjective
standard argued that the adoption of an objective standard
would freeze commercial practices." Bright-line rules or even
50. Id. at 1817.
51. Id. at 1819.
52. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1994) ("Consequential damages may be limited or ex-
cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.").
53. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercia Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812-13 (1958).
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just brighter-line rules-demanding objective rather than subjec-
tive good faith-do not always operate in favor of dominant
interest groups.5 4 Reliable conclusions about whom the rule
favors depend on the operation of the rule (as well as on the
operation of more ostensibly flexible alternatives).
A more fundamental incongruity plagues Scott's conclusion.
The rule that appears more flexible may indeed better afford
transactional certainty A court confronted with an ostensibly
certain rule that the court deems inconsistent with its own con-
ception of immanent justice will do violence to the statutory
prescription or ignore the statutory language altogether."5 Con-
sider, for example, the provision in the original version of Article
3 insulating depositary banks from liability for conversion when
they cashed checks bearing forged indorsements."6 The Code
protected the depositary in a manner that clearly made many
courts uncomfortable. Several decisions did not consider the
statutory formulation, which clearly favored banks." When Ar-
ticle 3 was revised, depositary banks were no longer insulated
from conversion liability 
5 8
The Article 2 experience with unconscionability also reveals
the relationship between bright-line rules and transaction cer-
tainty Section 2-302 of the Code provides that a court may void
an unconscionable contract or provision upon the court's finding,
as a matter of law, that the offensive contract or provision is
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 508 P.2d 428, 431-33 (Or. 1973)
(holding that a bank failed to act according to reasonable commercial standards
rather than insulating the bank from liability for conversion as provided by U.C.C. §
3-419(3)).
56. U.C.C. § 3-419(3).
57. See, e.g, Montgomery, 508 P.2d at 431-33; Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,
38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 483-84 (C.P Dauphin County 1965) (depositary bank that
paid funds over the counter to party presenting checks bearing forged indorsements
held to have paid out its own funds and to have remained in possession of proceeds
of check).
58. See U.C.C. § 3-420(c).
A representative, other than a depositary bank, who has in good faith dealt
with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the per-
son entitled to enforce the instrument is not liable m conversion to that
person beyond the amount of any proceeds that it has not paid out.
Id. (emphasis added).
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unconscionable. 9 The Code does not define the term "uncon-
scionable" and leaves the courts to their own devices to make
sense of this limitation on the freedom of contract." Professor
Leff criticized the unconscionability section as lacking a "reality
referent."6 ' In response, Professor Ellinghaus demonstrated
that this ostensible imprecision was the source of the power of
the unconscionability section; the provision enables courts to
discern the immanent justice of a situation and reach a result
consistent with that sense of the situation.62 Prior to the pro-
mulgation of the unconscionability rule, courts had to entertain
insubstantial common-law contract fictions to rule in favor of the
contract "victim.
6 3
Article 2A, the uniform personal property leasing law, con-
tains an unconscionability provision modeled after the Article 2
analog.' The Article 2A provision goes further, however, and
is more indulgent of the rights of the victims of predatory con-
tracting.' That development is particularly noteworthy in re-
gard to Scott's conclusions about the impact of dominant inter-
est groups because transactions within the scope of Article 2A
involve a dominant party-large institutional lessors of personal
property Article 2 does not similarly proceed from the perspec-
tive of a single dominant transactor group; the large institu-
tional seller is also the large institutional buyer. So, if any-
thing, Article 2A reasonably should have a more restrictive
rather than less restrictive unconscionability provision than the
one found in Article 2.
The foregoing treatment of the unconscionability principle in
the law of sales and leases is not intended to demonstrate that
commercial-law enactments are unmdulgent of particularly
59. Id. § 2-302(1).
60. See id. §§ 1-201, 2-103 (failing to define the term).
61. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 558 (1967).
62. M.P Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 814-15
(1969).
63. See td. at 763.
64. U.C.C. § 2A-108.
65. Note that U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) permits a court to grant "appropriate relief' if
another party's unconscionable conduct induces a consumer to enter into a lease
contract. U.C.C. § 2A-108(2).
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influential interest groups. Certainly, the influence of financial
institutions in payments law cannot be ignored. The point re-
mains, however, that Scott's analysis does not tell very much
about the influence of such groups on particular commercial
legislation. As careful consideration of his "proof' reveals, his
"test"6" for excessive influence and his criticism of the ALI and
the NCCUSL processes is fundamentally flawed.
According to Scott, the interest group model strongly suggests
that the competitive environment in which the drafting of legal
rules takes place directly affects their character. 7 He argues
that, "where several groups are in competition[,] the process will
tend to generate vague, imprecise rules and ambiguous stan-
dards."68 His favorite example of the "vague and nondirective"
rules that result from an absence of dominant interest groups
from the drafting process is Article 2.69 Within this area, Scott's
argument for his theory of lawmaking processes has some initial
plausibility
Unlike the various commercial actors who engage in transac-
tions governed by other articles of the Code, buyers and sellers
of goods share substantially the same interests. The seller in one
Article 2 transaction is often the buyer in the next. The fact that
buyers and sellers are interchangeable from one deal to the next
suggests that, at the time of Article 2's drafting, a single interest
group could not have dominated the private lawmakers. After
all, "Sears as buyer would not want to push too hard for fear of
prejudicing the interests of Sears as seller." ° So, Article 2 is a
66. Scott, supra note 4, at 1822-50.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1825.
69. Id. ("The striking contrast between the rules of Article 2 and those found m
Articles 3, 4, and 9 provide [sic] a particularly salient illustration of this observation.").
70. Peter A. Alces, Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 543, 544 (1993).
Schwartz and Scott make this same point in Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 645
("The effects of sales law do not fall systematically on any interest
group-businesses and consumers are both buyers and sellers."). This reality and the
fact that parties can contract out of most sales-law rules lead Schwartz and Scott to
surmise that commercial interest groups probably were not very active participants
in the original deliberations over Article 2 and to predict that they are unlikely to
take an active role in its revision. See td. at 646. The experience of these Authors
indicates otherwise. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Schwartz and Scott
thus suggest that Article 2 is loaded with vague rules not because interest groups
1232
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model statute that, in terms of interest group politics7' and
drafting style, seems to conform to Scott's model.
The Article 2 example does not, however, support the validity
of Scott's model as much as he implies. His conclusion is vulner-
able to a basic objection: it ignores the jurisprudential theories
of Professor Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter.12 To appreci-
ate this assertion, some background is needed.
During the late mneteenth century, a classical jurisprudence
prevailed in which the law was understood to be scientific; that
is, law was believed to be a discipline complete in itself, with
"rules" that had a umversality and validity that were abso-
lute. To proceed effectively, a court needed only to discover by
deduction the correct rule and apply it to the issues posed in the
dispute at hand, without regard for the practical or political con-
sequences of its application. 4 From the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, the foundations of this system of legal orthodoxy
were under attack, first from the early Progressives7' and, lat-
are in competition but because they are largely disinterested. See Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 4, at 645-47.
71. No cohesive interest group dominated the drafting process.
72. See Mooney, supra note 32, at 223.
Although much of the actual drafting of the various articles was
done by committees, Llewellyn was the coordinator and, as such, exer-
cised both tremendous influence and practical control over the whole
project. He and Professor Corbin served on the committee drafting the
sales article and in great measure Llewellyn wrote that section of the
Code to suit himself. The first version was published in 1949 and al-
though there have been numerous and extensive revisions since then, the
sales article and the all-important introductory article (Article 1) retain
most of the characteristics built into them by Llewellyn.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960,
at 4 (1992). According to Horwitz, Professor Duncan Kennedy was the first to char-
acterize this belief as "Classical Legal Thought." See id. at 3 n.i. Others have appro-
priately called it "mechanical junsprudence," see Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908), and "fundamentalism," see JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 48-56 (1930). Whatever its name, its most influential propo-
nent was Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell. WILLIAM TWIN-
ING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 10 (1973). For a succinct sum-
mary of classical legal ideas, see James B. Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor,
in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 354, 368-69
(1913).
74. See FRANK, supra note 73, at 8-9.
75. Morton Horwitz marks Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the
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er, during the 1920s and 1930s, from the "Legal Realists."76
These diverse theorists shared a common skepticism regarding
the existence of a structure of determinate and nondiscretionary
answers to legal questions. For them, law was not a structure of
neutral and nonpolitical norms that could be disengaged from
the realities of life.
One of the most dramatic examples of the move away from
classical legal thought can be seen in the law of contracts. As
early as 1919, Professor Corbin wrote that
law does not consist of a series of unchangeable rules or prm-
ciples Every system of justice and of right is of human
development, and the necessary corollary is that no known
system is eternal. In the long history of the law can be ob-
served the birth and death of legal principles. The law is
merely a part of our changing civilization. The history of law
is the history of man and of society Legal principles repre-
sent the prevailing mores of the time, and with the mores
they must necessarily be born, survive for the appointed sea-
son, and perish.77
The collapse of the classical model of contract at once freed the
legal system from an archaic emphasis on categorical thnking
and foreshadowed a profound "shift in method revealed by
the dominance of standards over rules in the processes of con-
Supreme Court used freedom of contract as a constitutional doctrine to strike down
a maximum hours law for bakers, as the watershed event that established progres-
sive legal thinking and marked the beginning of the end of classical thought,
HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 33-39. For a Progressive critique of Lochner, see Roscoe
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). The most striking tenet of the
Progressive movement was a belief that the legal system was inseparable from exist-
ing political and social conditions. See generally id. (describing social realities that
undermined judicial reasomng in the freedom of contract cases of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries).
76. The term "legal realism" has its genesis in an article by Llewellyn. See Karl
N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930). Although realism "was neither a coherent intellectual movement nor a consis-
tent or systematic jurisprudence," HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 169, Morton Horwitz
explains that "above all, Realism is a continuation of the Progressive attack on the
attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal Thought to create a sharp distinc-
tion between law and politics and to portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical,"
id. at 170.
77. Arthur L. Corbin, Preface to Third American Edition of WILLIAM R. ANSON,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 1919).
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tract formation and interpretation." 8 Into this setting came
Karl Llewellyn.
Llewellyn was one of the most influential figures in the realist
assault on the conceptualism of the old order. 9 He believed in
finding the law in the commercial context that gave rise to the
dispute. Accordingly, the judicial task was to discover this so-
called "immanent law" Llewellyn accepted the view that
[e]very fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order
can take it m, carries within itself its appropriate, natural
rules, its right law This is a natural law which is real, not
imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on
the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the na-
ture of man and of the life conditions of the time and place; it
is thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same,
but is indwelling m the very circumstances of life. The high-
est task of law-giving consists in uncovering and implement-
mg this immanent law 80
That Llewellyn assigned for himself the responsibility of draft-
ing Article 2 is not surprising. After all, the sales construct is a
peculiarly appropriate model for the drafting style that
Llewellyn had in mind. Unlike the. other articles of the Code,
Article 2 contemplates an essentially bipartite transaction be-
tween a seller and a buyer. Third parties may play a role, but
their participation is essentially minor.8" In the sales context,
the values of certainty and predictability are able to take a
78. Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 (1982) (footnote omitted).
79. See generally TWINING, supra note 73 (providing an interpretation of
Llewellyn's thought and its development).
80. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMiON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960) (quoting Levm,
Goldschmidt). According to Richard Danzig:.
Llewellyn saw law as an articulation and regularization of unconsciously
evolved mores-as a crystallization of a generally recognized and almost
indisputably right rule (a "singing reason"), inherent in, but very possibly
obscured by, existing patterns of relationships. To him an "immanent
law" lay embedded in any situation and the task of the law authority
was to discover it.
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 624 (1975).
81. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-104, -506 (1994) (financing agency); id. §§ 2-504, -509(i),
-705 (carrier); id. §§ 2-503(4), -509(2) (bailee).
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backseat to the need to divine and fulfill the parties' expecta-
tions created by their factual bargain. 2 To accomplish this,
Llewellyn drafted a statute that requires a court to familiarize
itself with relevant commercial practices. It does this
by utilizing flexible standards, such as commercial reason-
ableness and good faith, rather than rules that purport to
capture and solidify prevailing practices and norms. Each
dispute between a seller and buyer is placed in its functional
setting where the parties are expected to find and prove rele-
vant "habits," i.e., trade usage or practices, as part of the
agreement. Under these standards, the court is given flexibil-
ity (at some cost to certainty and admustrabflity) to resolve
the new or unique dispute. Moreover, standards are thought
to reduce the gap between law and practice and to insure
that decisions are practical and responsive to the needs, prov-
en in the particular case, of the parties and the relevant
business community "
82. The foundation for much of Article 2 is therefore made to rest on the concept
of "agreement." The definition provides: "'Agreement' means the bargain of the par-
ties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance " Id. §
1-201(3). Comment 1 to § 1-205 further reinforces the notion that expectations devel-
op in the context of commercial practices.
This Act rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading
of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement of the
parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their
action, read and interpreted m the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for inter-
pretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain and
supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.
Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1.
This emphasis on real commercial life may, at times, undermine Article 2's
certainty. Some find no fault m this conclusion. One of the Authors, for example,
has argued that the open-ended drafting style of Article 2 helps guide courts toward
the best results. See Alces, supra note 70, at 546; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The
Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1447, 1450-52
(1994) (discussing Article 2's flexible standards). Others, however, grimly contemplate
the prospect of cases with unpredictable outcomes. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 80,
at 630 ("[Tlhe Llewellyn approach seems paradoxically to undermine that very cer-
tainty and consistency in the law that the Uniform Commercial Code was dedicated
to obtaining."); Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814
(1962) ("The tastes of the practicing lawyers who advised the drafismen were, m
most cases, opposed to the flexible ideas of the Chief Reporter: they preferred, they
insisted on, a tightly-drawn statute, precise, detailed and rigid.").
83. PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
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Seen in this light, Article 2 is a 'jurisprudential statement." "
It reflects not merely a particular view about the appropriate
source of sales law but also, and perhaps more interestingly, a
distinctive theory about how cases ought to be decided.
Llewellyn recognized that deciding difficult cases involves con-
siderations of various inds. Because courts make their deci-
sions after the dispute has arisen and because the common law
focuses on individual cases, the common-law process has a sig-
nificant advantage over legislation in responding to changing
conditions and mores. The sales article reflects a salutary un-
derstanding that judges rather than legislators should make
some judgments of policy and principle. In sum, Article 2 is best
understood and defended as a means of facilitating common-law
decisionmakng. A quite general conclusion emerges from this
discussion: the style of Article 2 is the way it is because a "self-
conscious junsprude" drafted it.s In short, good reason exists
for doubting that the real cause of its imprecision is the ability
and willingness of interest groups to compete in the political
marketplace.
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 PRELuMINARY REPORT 9 (1990) (foot-
notes omitted). The drafting approach of Article 9 is quite different. Donald Rapson
describes the difference this way: "Compared to Article 2 which looks to the courts
and other forums to decide disputes by applying Article 2 prnciples, Article 9 en-
deavors to prevent the disputes by anticipating the issues and furnishing answers."
Alces, supra note 70, at 545 (quoting Letter from Donald J. Rapson, Member, Per-
manent Editorial Bd. of the UCC, to Peter A. Alces, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Alabama 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1986)). The odd thing is that Scott himself
suggests at least one functional distinction between Articles 2 and 9 that may ex-
plain the different drafting styles. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1799-1800 ("Article 9's
filing system seeks to regulate the provision of information, leaving the regulation of
misbehavior to private ordering among the parties."). Notice, however, that, when
Article 9 attempts to regulate behavior, as it does in Part 5, it does so in a style
similar to the approach taken in Article 2. See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase
(of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficiency Actions: What Does
Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649, 680-92 (1992-1993) (criticizing the
application of the "commercial reasonableness" standard when applied in the context
of deficiency actions).
84. Alces, supra note 70, at 543.
85. Danzig, supra note 80, at 621.
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B. Commercial Legislation by Public Legislature: The
Bankruptcy Code Experience
No one has the data necessary to draw intellectually defensi-
ble conclusions about patterns of special interest group influence
on both the private and public lawmaking processes. The im-
pression that a PL is especially vulnerable to interest group
capture is almost certainly incorrect. Instances in which a PL
might have succumbed to the will of a special interest group
whose interests may not coincide with the public interest may
provide a basis for criticism of the PL as a lawmaking institu-
tion. The issue, however, really must be: with what should the
decisions of a PL be compared? Public legislatures are also far
from perfect. The legislative output of public legislatures shows
signs of interest group influence no better, and perhaps far
worse, than the indications of such pressure seen in the product
of PLs."6 Indeed, in light of the more complete and systematic
evidence regarding the commercial legislation produced by pub-
lic legislatures, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that, at least
in the area of commercial law, the ALI and the NCCUSL are
two of our society's most reliable lawmaking institutions.
Several bodies of federal law clearly reflect the political de-
mands of special interests. Perhaps the most prominent example
is bankruptcy law, which is so riddled with legal rules designed
to benefit the narrow preferences of discrete interest groups
rather than those of the public-at-large that it has compromised
the potential rehabilitation of many financially distressed com-
panies." The following examples provide just a small sampling
of special interest legislation netted from the Bankruptcy Code
as it stood prior to the 1994 amendments."
When the Supreme Court held that firms could reject unfavor-
86. See, e.g., infra notes 87-107 and accompanying text.
87. This theme has been articulated in much of the academic commentary on the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114: Congress' Emp-
ty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 17, 19 (1993) ("T]here is a
growing sentiment among prominent members of the bankruptcy community that the
proliferation of special interest legislation in the Bankruptcy Code tends to thwart
one of its primary functions: the financial rehabilitation of struggling companies.").
88. For discussion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see infra notes 99-107
and accompanying text.
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able collective bargaining agreements because they were execu-
tory contracts,89 Congress came under immediate fire from or-
gamzed labor seeking protective legislation." As a result of this
intense lobbying effort, § 1113 was added to the Bankruptcy
Code." This section permits a firm to escape its collective bar-
gaining agreement only after it has engaged in elaborate negoti-
ations.92 Admittedly, there is room for disagreement about
whether tins legislation coincides with the public interest. The
tension between the influence of a special interest group and the
congressional response is, however, undeniable.
Another manifestation of the significant influence of a discrete
interest group is § 1114, which favors retiree claims to medical
benefits by treating the firm's obligations as adnnmstrative
expenses." The result is that the debtor will pay these claims
89. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The Court was
unanimous m its holding that the term "executory contract" m § 365(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code includes collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 517-27. In a narrow
five-to-four decision, the Court also held that a debtor does not commit an unfair
labor practice when it unilaterally rejects or modifies a collective bargaining agree-
ment without prior approval of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 532-34.
90. See William Sernn, Labor Leaders Voice Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1984,
at D25; see also Charlene R. Ehrenwerth & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The New Bank-
ruptcy Procedures for Rejection of Collective-Bargaining Agreements: Is the Pendulum
Swinging Back, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 939, 950 (1985) (describing Congress's swift reaction
in the wake of Bildisco); Richard H. Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1984) (describing congressional deadlock over corrective legisla-
tion); Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement-A
Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 293, 312-21 (1984) (same); James J. White, The Bildisco Case and the
Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV: 1169, 1190-98 (1984) (same).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994).
92. Essentially, § 1113 provides that a bankruptcy court may approve the rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement only after: (1) the debtor makes a proposal that
provides for modifications to the agreement "necessary" to permit an effective reor-
ganization, (2) the union rejects the proposal without good cause, and (3) the balance
of equities clearly favors rejection of the agreement. Id. § 1113(c)(1)-(3). This section
reflects "insistent congressional effort to replace the Bildisco standard with one that
[is] more sensitive to the national policy favoring collective bargaining agreements."
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1089 (3d
Cir. 1986).
93. The Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334,
§ 2(a), 102 Stat. 610 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1114), added § 1114 to the Bankruptcy
Code. Daniel Keating wrote about the impetus behind the law.
Anybody even vaguely familiar with this law knows that it was enacted
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ahead of the claims of current employees and unsecured
creditors. 4 Not surprisingly, many commentators with little
sympathy for legislators subject to interest group pressure have
adopted the view that this retiree legislation, driven by one
particular interest group, and the rehabilitative goal of Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code are incompatible. Leslie T. Gladstone
put it this way-
Special interest legislation is becoming increasingly preva-
lent under the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 was designed to
balance the various competing interests. That delicate bal-
ance is upset by special interest legislation. Certainly retirees
are deserving of protection. Equally deserving, however, are
tort claimants or, indeed, low-income creditors as a whole. If
Congress were to accommodate all deserving interests, chap-
ter l1's utility would effectively be destroyed. Congress's
selective accommodation seriously undermines the policy
favoring equal distribution among creditors. An overall bene-
fit can be achieved only if the various claimants share equal-
ly and refrain from fighting for preferential treatment. 5
These observations about § 1114 do not necessarily mean that
every provision motivated by special interest politics is wrong.
The Bankruptcy Code's text and legislative history, however,
prove that the section was a triumph for one politically active
group. These considerations weigh against facile acceptance of
the belief that PLs are peculiarly susceptible to influence by a
dominant interest group.
Ironically, at least in the realm of bankruptcy law, the phe-
in direct response to LTV Corporation's cutoff of retiree medical benefits
when it entered chapter 11 bankruptcy in the summer of 1986. In effect,
the new legislation told LTV and any other company with similar inten-
tions that they must, absent extenuating circumstances, continue to honor
promises of medical benefits made to retirees even if the company was in
chapter 11.
Keating, supra note 87, at 17-18. Although the modification of retiree benefits is
possible under a process strikingly similar to the steps required under § 1113 for
rejection of collective bargaining agreements, see supra note 92, there is some evi-
dence that Congress intended greater protection for retiree benefits, see Leslie T.
Gladstone, Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988: Welfare Benefits in
Need of Reform, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 447 (1991).
94. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507, 726.
95. Gladstone, supra note 93, at 450-51 (footnotes omitted).
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nomenon of capture extends beyond the efforts of lobbyists for
private special interests. When the issue was the constitutional
status of bankruptcy judges and the bankruptcy courts, even the
Chief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference of
the United States became active lobbyists. 6 No one has yet
come forward with evidence of this type of judicial intrusion into
the private legislative process. 7
The point goes deeper still. Scott surmises that secured fi-
nancing insiders enjoy an orgamzational advantage in dealing
96. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy judges, as Article I judges, were
without judicial power under the Constitution to hear a Marathon-type case rnvolv-
ing purely state-law issues when no basis of jurisdiction other than the Bankruptcy
Code existed, id. at 76. These cases could only be heard by an Article III judge with
life tenure. Id. The practical effect of this decision was to undermine the entire
jurisdictional scheme of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Congress could have provided
the necessary constitutional fix simply by making the bankruptcy judges Article III
judges. Tins idea proved to be politically unfeasible. See New Court Dect-
swns-Bankruptcy, 53 U.S.L.W. 2297, 2298 (Dec. 18, 1984). Instead, Congress re-
sponded with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
which gave the requisite bankruptcy jurisdiction to Article III judges in the district
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994). Congress then provided that district courts can
delegate jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts in "cases under" the Bankruptcy Code
and in "proceedings arising under or arising in or related to" the Code. Id. §
157(a). Still, constitutional issues remain. See generally Vern Countryman, The Bank-
ruptcy Judges: Jurisdiction by Neglect, 92 COM. L.J. 1 (1987) (critiquing the uncer-
tain bases for bankruptcy court jurisdiction); Lloyd King, A Chart of Bankruptcy Ju-
risdiction for Admiralty Lawyers, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1264 (1985) (describing procedures
by which admiralty lawyers may avoid bankruptcy court jurisdiction). Professor
Countryman explains why:
Many of the 1984 defects are doubtlessly due to the fact that too
many special interest cooks were stirring the broth, each concerned with
adding its own ingredient but without much knowledge of or interest in
the impact on the overall end product. Nothing more is to be expected of
lobbyists for the consumer credit industry or other private interests. But
it is most disturbing that the special interest lobbyists in this case in-
cluded the Cief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference
of the United States. It is also most disturbing that the one ingredient
essential to them m any solution was that bankruptcy judges not be
given Article III status.
Vern Countryman, Scrambling To Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice,
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 43-44
(1985).
97. For a recent discussion of the propriety of a judge's participation in ALI delib-
erations and projects, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories:
Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 25-30.
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with private legislators that is lacking in their dealings with
public lawmakers."5 Yet the recently enacted Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994 paradoxically suggests a different understand-
ing of the relative ease with which this group can capture a
public legislature. On its face, this legislation is far more hospi-
table to the interests of secured creditors than to the needs of
unsecured creditors.9 9 Many of its provisions do not merely pro-
vide a clear statement from Congress and thus seek to promote
principles of consistent and certain adjudication; they represent
a quite general effort to resolve issues in a way that systemati-
cally benefits secured parties.' 0
Examples include overruling the Depnzzo line of cases,'
protecting security interests in postpetition rents,'0 ' expanding
98. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1818 ("This suggests, inter alia, that an institu-
tion that functions as the ALI and NCCUSL do is sometimes easier to influence
than ordinary legislatures; as a consequence, it will enact more special interest
legislation.").
99. This notion apparently contradicts Scott's statement that "there is at least
impressionistic evidence that unsecured creditors, managers, and debtors had some
role in molding the Bankruptcy Code to suit their needs, which were driven in large
part by the sympathetic stance toward secured creditors evident in Article 9." Id. at
1849 n.215.
100. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
101. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490
(6th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson
Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin.
Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (generally referred to in the bankruptcy field as
In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.). In these cases, courts reasoned that, in situations
involving an "insider" guarantee, the trustee has authority to recapture preferential
payments made to undersecured and unsecured creditors a full year prior to the
bankruptcy filing. See Ray, 899 F.2d at 1494; Manufacturers Hanover, 892 F.2d at
850; Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1193-94. The new law changes the Deprzio result by add-
ing a new subsection (c) to 11 U.S.C. § 550. This provision makes it clear that
transfers made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition cannot
be recovered from non-insider transferees. 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (1994).
102. In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1979), the Court held that
lenders have a security interest in postpetition rents only to the extent that they
have perfected their security interest under applicable state law. Because, in many
states, this requirement involves the appointment of a receiver, creditors who failed
to take this step have often had secured claims denied. See, e.g., In re Multi-Group
III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re Metro Square, 93 B.R.
990 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988), order rev'd, 106 B.R. 584 (D. Minn. 1989); In re TM
Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 928 F.2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1991). The Bankruptcy Code now provides for an enforceable security
interest in rents if the secured party has perfected the lien on the underlying prop-
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the protection given to purchase money security interests,1"3
broademng the exceptions to the automatic stay,10 4 and en-
hancing the rights of secured creditors in consumer bankrupt-
cies.'0 5 Any suggestion that the decidedly pro-secured creditor
stance taken by the new act is unrelated to interest group poli-
tics would be odd. Indeed, many of the new provisions appear to
be a self-conscious effort to reflect a particular interest group's
own view of how the Bankruptcy Code ought to work. i0 6
If the above assertions are true, the establishment of a Na-
tional Bankruptcy Review Comnssion to review the Code might
be defended as a frank recognition that, at times, a study group
similar to the NCCUSL model is umquely well situated to make
relevant policy decisions.0 7 This assessment is not a mecham-
erty and the security agreement extends to rents. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Moreover,
subject to an "equities of the case" exception, this subsection also protects a secured
party's interest in revenue streams generated by hotels and other lodging properties.
Id.
103. Congress amended § 547(c)(3) to provide that a trustee may not avoid as a
preference the perfection of a purchase money security interest if it occurs within 20
days of the debtor's receiving possession of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3). Con-
gress intended the extension of the grace period from 10 to 20 days to conform the
Bankruptcy Code with the prevailing version of UCC § 9-301(2). Id. § 547 (historical
and revision notes).
104. One important new exception involves "single asset real estate," as defined in
§ 101(51B). A secured creditor may have the stay lifted after 90 days unless the
debtor has filed a reasonable reorganization plan or has commenced monthly interest
payments to the creditor. Id. § 362(d)(3). Another noteworthy change is to § 1110.
Formerly, this section permitted a creditor to ignore the automatic stay if it claimed
a purchase money security interest in certain types of aircraft and vessels. See 11
U.S.C. § 1110 (1992). Congress has now broadened the scope of § 1110 to include all
security interests, not just interests obtained to enable the debtor to acquire the
equipment. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994).
105. Congress amended § 522(f) to prohibit debtor avoidance of nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money security interests in tools, animals, and crops to the extent that
the value of such property is in excess of $5,000. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(3) (1994). This
new provision, however, applies only when the debtor has chosen or is required to
utilize the state exemptions and the state prohibits the avoidance of consensual liens
on exempt property or state law permits exemptions without limitation in amount.
See id.
106. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
107. Title VI of the new act provides for the creation of a ne-member commission
to study the Bankruptcy Code and make formal recommendations on needed reforms.
See National Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Presi-
dent, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States appoint members of the
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cal exercise to uncover general legislative superiority It calls for
a judgment about comparative competence, undertaken in light
of the statutory structure and the applicable considerations of
both fact and policy Special interest group politics poses no
more significant challenge to the PL process than it does to
lawmaking as a whole.
IV THE FILING SYSTEM
Scott reviewed the Article 9 revision committee's treatment of
the filing system to prove his points about the failures of the
uniform commercial law drafting process."8 In Scott's estima-
tion, the dominance of large institutional lenders tilts the filing
system playing field in favor of those lenders' interests. 9 Scott
errs both in his understanding of the filing system rules, includ-
ing their operation and political context, and inhis conclusions
concerning what the filing system reveals about the politics of
Article 9 and the uniform commercial law movement.
A. Scott on Filing System Politics
The filing system of Article 9 is the foundation of the uniform
personal property security law 110 Article 9 is a "race" statute
because the first to file or otherwise perfect a collateral interest
in the debtor's property will have priority over virtually all com-
Commission. Id. § 604(a). Members of Congress and the executive branch are meligi-
ble for appointment. Id. The principal benefits of the Commission seem to be a re-
duction in the influence of special interest groups and a corresponding increase in
the influence of "experts" with a greater understanding of the reorgamzation process
and of the general thrust of bankruptcy law. See J. Vincent Aug, Jr., "A View from
the Bench" or the Other "R" Word, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 403 (1992).
I think of what a powerful and prestigious review commission could ac-
complish. First of all, it could be an end to tinkering with the Code by
special interest groups. These special interest groups' understanding of
the Bankruptcy Code almost never gets beneath the surface of
nondischargeability of a certain type of debt or inclusion or exclusion of
types of assets from a bankruptcy estate. If you showed these folks a
judicial impact statement, they wouldn't understand what you were talk-
ing about. They are very superficial in their approach.
Id.
108. Scott, supra note 4, at 1788-90.
109. Id. at 1785-87.
110. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1994) (setting forth provisions for required filings).
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peting creditors."' The debtor and all creditors of the debtor
thus depend on the integrity of the filing system. So long as the
system works, the cost of credit should be less than if a coherent
filing or public notice system were not in place.
The current Article 9 filing system has been the subject of
substantial debate, both in academic and practitioner circles." 2
The committee drafting the revision of Article 9 has drawn upon
comprehensive studies of the current filing system to fashion
adjustments to the status quo."' They have designed these ad-
justments to improve the integrity of the system and thereby
lower the cost of credit by reducing some of the risk imposed on
the Article 9 scheme by deficiencies in the filing system." In
addition, the drafting committee has rethought the place of
perfection by filing in the array of available and sometimes
competing forms of perfection." 5
Amendments to filing practices are problematic to effect for a
number of reasons. First, a comprehensive commercial statute
such as Article 9 cannot easily micromanage the interstices of
the filing system, a regime largely within the province of clerical
and admimstrative staff at the state and local levels throughout
the country 116 Second, the benefits of improving the system
111. Id. § 9-301 (establishing priorities for certain creditors based on filing status).
112. A recent symposium issue of the Minnesota Law Review was devoted to the
Article 9 filing system. Symposium, "Managing the Paper Trail"- Evaluating and
Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995).
113. PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 88 (1992) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]; Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9
Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 101-05, 115-24 (1991); see PEB STUDY GROUP,
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 APPENDICES TO REPORT 15-136 (1992) (providing the results of
the Article 9 Filing System Task Force's study of the current filing system).
114. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 88.
115. For a review of alternative perfection systems, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki,
Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic
Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 5 (discussing the possibility
and promise of a computerized filing system); David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection:
From Possessin to Filing Under Article 9 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(analyzing the considerations that have contributed to the declining importance of
possession), 59 B.U. L. REv. 209 (1979) (examining the impact of possession on the
Article 9 filing system).
116. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1994) (setting forth detailed filing requirements, including
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are not compelling because the parties that would realize the
greatest gains from improvement of the system have not indicat-
ed that they have any means of effecting the improvements."'
Third, no consensus exists as to what would constitute real
improvement of the system because no consensus has arisen as
to what the system should do."' Fourth, the filing system is
captive to the technology spiral; the available means to modern-
ize (i.e., computerize) the system multiply apace, but not all
filing venues can afford to avail themselves of the evolving tech-
nologies." 9 Paradoxically, the pace of advance combined with
the inconsistent level of funding for new technologies within and
among the states means that the prospects for true uniformity of
filing practices may be more bleak than at any time in the histo-
ry of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Any determination of the adjustments in the filing system
that would best serve the interests of a particular constituency
necessitates a coming to terms with the way in which the sys-
tem, as currently constituted, fixes the priority of some creditors
over others. The general rule of Article 9 is "first to file or per-
fect wins." 2 ' The race characteristic of the system favors the
vigilant and punishes individuals who do not appreciate the
system's operation and who fail to apprise themselves of the
information that the system provides or to provide the informa-
tion that the system requires.
Against that "first-in-time-wins" backdrop, current Article 9
provides certain exceptions and traps for the less wary For
example, a financing statement improperly filed will still operate
against an individual with actual knowledge of it,'' thus dilut-
ing the pure race nature of the system. In addition and more
proper localities in which to file).
117. See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679,
707 (1995) (arguing that the only purpose of the filing system is to assure secured
creditors of the priority interests given under Article 9).
118. Id. at 692-704.
119. See LoPucki, supra note 115, at 15 (discussing technological improvements m
the filing system).
120. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -312 (listing creditors who take priority over unperfected
security interests and establishing rules for prioritizing among conflicting security
interests).
121. Id. § 9-401(2).
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consequentially, Article 9 provides special rules to favor pur-
chase money financing, assuring, so the argument goes, that one
lender will not enjoy monopoly power over the debtor.'22 Fur-
ther, in some circumstances, the article deems certain creditors
automatically perfected, without any necessity of a filing.2 '
That means that automatic perfection may, on the right facts,
prevail over a security interest perfected by filing. In other
instances, "secret liens" operate in favor of individuals who have
not been the first to file or perfect in the proper venue.'25
Large institutional creditors, the group that Scott argues is in
the best position to influence the revision of Article 9,126 en-
gage in many forms of secured and unsecured lending. Some of
the secured lending is "purchase money," and other portions of a
particular bank's portfolio may involve unsecured loans, worung
capital loans secured by all or only a portion of the tangible and
intangible assets of a debtor. As a result, the form of both the
lending and the collateral will determine, from one case to the
next, which Article 9 rules will operate. To the extent that a rule
reduces the lender's risk in some loans but does so at the ex-
pense of competing creditor interests, that same rule may in-
crease the lender's risk in the next deal and thereby the cost of
that loan.
Professor Gillette recognized this key to the failure of Scott's
test of interest group impact on the Article 9 revision process: "I
have some quibble with the inherent assumption that the world
can easily be divided into camps of secured and unsecured credi-
tors or occasional creditors and financial insiders such that
members of each camp share the same interests."'27 The foot-
note accompanying that text is telling:
122. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Prior-
ities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-75 (1979) (discussing situational
monopoly and the purchase money priority).
123. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(2)-(4), -304 to -305.
124. Id. § 9-312.
125. See LoPucki, supra note 115, at 7-9 (discussing filings that remain effective
even though they cannot be discovered in a search).
126. See Scott, supra, note 4, at 1786-87.
127. Clayton P Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REV.
1853, 1857 (1994).
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The interests of those who take purchase money security
interests or who are more likely to be purchasers of chattel
paper will vary from the interests of general financers who
take wraparound security interests. Thus, any complete in-
terest group theory will have to account for the way conflicts
among these groups are treated in the revisin process.
Insofar as Scott's premise that large institutional creditors occu-
py one transactional position and benefit from rules that favor
that position at the expense of those occupying other posi-
tions'29 relies on Ins incomplete appreciation of large institu-
tional creditors' loan portfolios, the conclusions proceeding from
that premise are necessarily flawed. Consideration of Scott's
particular conclusions about the operation of the filing system
revisions with respect to purchase money security interests and
proceeds of collateral reveals the fatal flaw
In the section of Ins article captioned "Filing, PMSIs, and
Proceeds,"' Scott describes the Article 9 Study Group Report
on the state of the filing system and then compares the propos-
als for reform with Ins conception of the interests of large insti-
tutional secured creditors."3' Scott correctly explains that the
Article 9 Study Group Report on the filing system described
numerous deficiencies of the extant system. 2 He also writes
that, in response, "the Filing Report recommended a series of
revisions, ranging from wholesale technological reform, to keep-
ing the current system while reqiring more centralized filing
practices, such as filing by taxpayer identification number, clari-
fying the debtor's name requirement, and imposing time limits
on filing processing."
133
128. Id. at 1857 n.9.
129. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1785-87.
130. Id. at 1829.
131. Id. at 1829-38.
132. Id. at 1829-30.
133. Id. In the footnote accompanying that text, Scott somewhat cryptically and cu-
rously observes that "neither the minutes nor the correspondence of the Study
Group indicate that its members ever questioned the assumption that the concerns
enumerated in the Filing Report cause real hardship for secured creditors." Id. at
1830 n.140. Is Scott suggesting that deficiencies in the status quo do not compro-
mise the efficiency and reliability of the system? Would not any deficiency that un-
dermines the certainty of the system necessarily increase risk and therefore increase
1248
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Scott opines that the Study Group could have recommended
one of "two polar alternatives" -- a reinforcement of the role
of the filing system at the expense of the primary secured credi-
tors who, Scott concludes, would subsidize the expensive im-
provements or, alternatively, the elimination of public filing
altogether.' Scott then explains that the Study Group Report
advocated a middle ground-a compromise-Scott asserts, that
is best explained by his interest group analysis."6 The com-
promise expands "the existing categories of exemptions from
some or all of the filing rules so long as the benefits of the
larger exemptions accrue to members of the [dominant interest
group, large institutional secured creditors]." ' Scott never
makes clear why these powerful interest groups did not simply
use all of their resources to abrogate the filing system altogeth-
er. ' s Such a result occurred in the promulgation of Article 2A,
when the ostensible ownership issues were before the drafting
committee, and the final product included no filing requirement
whatsoever.'39
B. Choice of Law
Scott offers the Study Group recommendations concerning
choice of law as a "clear example" 4 ° of the type of relatively
precise rule indicative of interest group capture." Currently,
the correct office for filing purposes, though of critical impor-
tance to the secured party,' can be difficult to determine."
the cost of all secured transactions m which filing matters? The point is not that
deficiencies of the filing system cause hardship for secured creditors but rather that
they burden the secured credit system and thereby cause hardship for all creditors.
Debtors are also affected because they will pay more for credit than they would if
the security system was more reliable.
134. Id. at 1830.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1830-31.
137. Id. at 1832.
138. See id. at 1831 n.144 (discussing the incentive structure in public and private
disclosure systems).
139. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1994).
140. Scott, supra note 4, at 1826.
141. Id.
142. If the secured party files in the wrong place or not in all of the places re-
quired by the UCC, the security interest will remain unperfected. In re Walker, 142
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The first thing to decide is the state in which the secured party
must file a financing statement.1 " The answer to this-question
is found in the conflict-of-laws rules of section 9-103.14 This
section consists of six subsections, each of which contains the
conflict-of-laws provision for a particular type of collateral.
14
The primary rule for tangible collateral with a relatively perma-
nent situs is that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collat-
eral is located governs perfection and the effect of perfection. 47
On its face, such a rule seems simple enough. The secured
party must only determine where the collateral is located and
then comply with that jurisdiction's perfection reqmrements.141
Such a rule, though simple, is not satisfactory; the various types
B.R. 484, 485 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (construing the filing requirement strictly).
The general rule is that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act a security agree-
ment is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Despite the general rule, an un-
perfected security interest is unenforceable against most third parties because the
number of exceptions to the general rule have, in fact, gobbled up the rule. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9-301 (listing persons who take priority over an unperfected security inter-
est); see also 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994) (declaring that the bankruptcy trustee
prevails over secured creditors whose interests are unperfected on the date of
bankruptcy).
143. The number of cases involving an allegedly nisfiled financing statement re-
ported in a UCC reporting service exceeds 200. 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) §§
9401.26-.27 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
144. After the secured party resolves the "which state" question, she must deter-
mine the proper office or offices within the state with which to file the financing
statement. UCC § 9-401(1) offers each adopting state the choice of three alternative
provisions that fix the place to file. U.C.C. § 9-401(1). Depending on which provision
a state adopts, the answer to the "where in the state" question could depend on the
debtor's place of residence or business, the location of the collateral, or the use of
the collateral. Id. Because Scott ignores the Study Group's position on this second
question, this Article will do the same.
145. Id. § 9-103.
146. The six categories of collateral are: (1) documents, instruments, and ordinary
goods; (2) goods covered by a certificate of title; (3) accounts, general intangibles,
and mobile goods; (4) chattel paper; (5) minerals; and (6) investment property. Id.
147. Id. Section 9-103(1)(b) provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect
of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest m collateral are gov-
erned by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last
event occurs on wich is based the assertion that the security interest is
perfected or unperfected.
Id.
148. Id.
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of collateral covered by section 9-103(1) have a relatively fixed
location but are nevertheless capable of movement. 49 There-
fore, section 9-103(1) combines a temporal test with a location
test. The statute also tells the secured party to determine the
location of the collateral when "the last event occurs on which is
based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or
unperfected."15 This provision is the so-called "last event"
test. 
15
The Study Group Report recommended applying the law of
the jurisdiction where the debtor is located. 5 2 It did so for sev-
eral reasons. First, the Study Group focused on the benefits of
having a single choice-of-law rule.5 ' For example, a single rule
will obviate the need for a secured party to make multiple filings
in many cases in which such filings are now necessary "" One
problem with current section 9-103 arises when the debtor does
business in more than one jurisdiction. A secured party who
wishes to perfect a security interest in the debtor's inventory
and accounts must now file both where the inventory is locat-
ed155 and where the debtor is located. 5 ' This double filing
would not be necessary in a one-rule regime.'57
149. See id. § 9-103(l) (covering "[d]ocuments, instruments, and ordinary goods").
150. Id. § 9-103(i)(b).
151. The potential ambiguity of the last event test can make its application ex-
traordinarily difficult. For example, must the last event be one of the statutory
events required for perfection? The review group that analyzed the issue said "no,"
characterizing the requirement as an "all events" test. FINAL REPORT, supra note
113, at 78. For an overview of the last event test, see David Frisch, U.C.C. Filings:
Changing Circumstances Can Make a Right Filing Wrong. But Can They Make a
Wrong Filing Right?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1263-71 (1983). The Study Group
waffles on whether any form of the last event test deserves inclusion in the new
Article 9. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 78-79.
152. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 74. The report recommends that the "loca-
tion of the collateral" be retained for those instances in which the secured party
perfects by possession. Id.
153. Id. at 75.
154. Id.
155. U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (1994).
156. To perfect a security interest in accounts, the UCC requires a filing in the ju-
nsdiction where the debtor is located. Id. § 9-103(3).
157. In addition, going to a single rule will make it easier for a secured party to
claim a continuously perfected security interest in proceeds without having to make
a second filing. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 75.
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Further, because debtors change location less often than does
collateral, one consequence of a rule that turns on the location of
the debtor will be a reduction of the burden of alertness present-
ly imposed upon secured parties.'58 No longer will a secured
party run the risk of losing its perfected security interest
through the interstate shuffling or movement of goods by the
debtor or third parties.'59 Changing the baseline rule thus may
decrease the secured party's overall costs.
In making the case for his interest group model, Scott may
well be correct when he states that the location of the debtor
rule is "cheaper for a primary lender."60 General financiers,
however, may not be the only winners if this rule change is
adopted. When facing a complex task such as predicting the be-
havior of buyers and creditors, the absence of systematic and
well-controlled data and a dependence on casually asserted
myths about the system are hinderances.
Consider, for example, the implications of the Study Group's
recommendation for purchasers of discrete goods. Scott assumes
that their costs will increase. 6' One might, however, conclude
otherwise. Under current section 9-103(1)(d), if a secured party
properly perfects its security interest under the law of the place
where the collateral is located when the relevant last event
occurs, the original filing remains effective for up to four months
after the debtor takes the goods to another state. 6' If the se-
cured party refiles in the removal state within this statutory
grace period, the security interest will continue perfected with-
out interruption. 6'
A major consequence of the four-month rule is that fraudulent
debtors can go a long way towards making a filing disappear
simply by taking goods across state lines. An innocent purchaser
wishing to buy the collateral thus must assure herself that the
goods have been in-state for at least four months without a
filing, or she must check (assuming this information can some-
158. Id. at 76-77.
159. See znfra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
160. Scott, supra note 4, at 1828.
161. Id.
162. U.C.C. § 9-103(i)(d)(i) (1994).
163. Id. § 9-103(i)(d)(ii).
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how be obtained) for a filing in every state where the debtor
does or has done business. If a location-of-the-debtor rule be-
comes effective in the revision of section 9-103(1), this problem,
for the most part, will go away '
On the one hand, purchasers might incur greater expenses by
searching for a filing "in a potentially distant location."" 5 On
the other hand, if the proposed rule change reduces the likeli-
hood that the debtor will be able to mislead purchasers, their
costs might be less. 6' In sum, no one has the data necessary to
draw intellectually defensible conclusions about "who wins" and
"who loses" if the Code switches to a location-of-the-debtor rule.
In fact, asking such a question can easily produce meaningless
or misleading answers.
C. Purchase Money Security Interests
In considering the Study Group's suggestions concerning pur-
chase money security interests (PMSI), Scott again maintains
that he has uncovered evidence of interest group power.'67 His
claims about PMSIs can be summed up in two related asser-
tions: (1) the direct costs and deficiencies of the filing system
provide an incentive for primary or dominant creditors to opt out
of the system by relying on private disclosure,' and (2) the
164. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 76 ("[D]ebtors are unlikely to change
locations as frequently as collateral does.").
165. Scott, supra note 4, at 1828. Even this conclusion is highly speculative. An
obvious first step in any analysis of whether a purchaser's costs will increase, de-
crease, or remain the same is to study the relevant class to see what percentage of
potential purchasers will actually use the filing system. In some instances, a pur-
chaser would be better off by not searching. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (providing that a
misfiled financing statement is nonetheless effective "against any person who has
knowledge of the contents of such financing statement"). Second, one must know who
conducts searches (e.g., purchasers, attorneys, or private search firms) and how their
costs compare. Finally, questions remain as to how the choice of filing office affects
those costs. Each issue is worthy of serious attention.
166. Even now, a purchaser of goods may have to search for filings where the
debtor is located if the goods are "mobile goods" under § 9-103(3) or if the purchaser
is unsure of their classification. In fact, in the latter case, a prudent purchaser
would be wise to search where the goods are located (the rule for ordinary goods)
and where the debtor is located (the rule for mobile goods).
167. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1832-35.
168. See id. at 1829-32.
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recommendations offered by the Study Group would permit more
of these financial insiders to escape from the Code's first-in-time
priority rule by making it easier for them to achieve purchase
money status.6 9
This view seems rather confusing and probably not entirely
consistent. In discussing the recommendations concerning choice
of law, Scott refers to general financiers as the dominant class of
secured creditors17 ° and seems to adopt the Study Group's con-
clusion that
the location of the debtor rule has offsetting costs that must
be borne by other creditors, such as purchase money
financers of discrete goods, who must now file in the state
where the debtor is located (which is a more problematic
exercise than filing where the newly acquired collateral is
located).'
On this view, if understood correctly, no gains by PMSI credi-
tors should result if those gains would be detrimental to the
interests of primary lenders.'72 In contrast, if PMSI creditors
are the ones who exercised the greatest influence over the
Study Group, then Scott would have to explain why the sug-
gested conflicts rules look the way that they do. Quite a differ-
ent possibility is that these two interest groups were in compe-
tition. Where, then, are the vague general standards predicted
by Scott's model? 7
169. At the end of his critique of the PMSI revisions, Scott claims that "[tihe ef-
fects are twofold. First, firms are likely to rely increasingly on private disclosure as
a substitute method of policing against debtor misbehavior. Second, the costs of the
filing system are increasingly externalized from primary or dominant creditors to
less informed or 'occasional' creditors." Id. at 1834-35. Scott ignores the fact that, if
the PMSI is in inventory, the PMSI creditor must continue to rely on the filing
system for information about prior claims because such claimants must receive notice
before delivery of the goods to the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
170. Scott, supra note 4, at 1827.
171. Id. at 1828.
172. Because a PMSI creditor will be able to gain priority over prior creditors with
floating liens, U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4), a rule that benefits the former will almost al-
ways come at the expense of primary lenders. This analysis assumes that lenders
who engage in general financing are not also substantially engaged m purchase
money financing, a conclusion that Scott apparently takes for granted.
173. At one point, Scott does acknowledge that PMSI creditors are in competition
with other creditors and claims that the Study Group's unwillingness to recommend
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Despite the indispensability of current judicial and statutory
trends as an ingredient m malkng sense of the Study Group
Report, direct consideration of this data is absent from Scott's
discussion. The Study Group's proposal to revise sections 9-
301(2) and 9-312(4) to extend the grace period for perfecting
PMSIs from ten to twenty days provides one illustration of how
the absence of this information might lead to distorted
inferences.'74 The Final Report explains that "[alt least 34
states have amended § 9-301(2), § 9-312(4), or both, so as to
extend the 'grace period' for achieving PMSI priority from 10
days to 20 days. In addition, two states have extended each
period to 15 days and two others have extended each period to
21 days."' 5 Iromcally, this trend suggests that, if there is a po-
litical story of interest group pressure to tell, it unfolded across
the country in public, not private legislatures.'
D. Proceeds
Scott thinks that, like its treatment of PMSIs, the Final
Report's treatment of proceeds gives the reader a meaningful
grasp of the political dynamic."77 The purpose of this Article is
not to interpret the evidence but to illustrate several additional
sorts of evidence-seemingly more than baseless conclusion or
mere anecdote but, on examnation, no more informative. 7 '
a default formula for the allocation of payments to a creditor with a PMSI and a
non-PMSI security interest in the same collateral is consistent with the prediction of
his model. Scott, supra note 4, at 1834 n.155. He does not explain why, if there is
competition among classes of creditors, there are bright-line rules favorable to PMSI
creditors on other issues. While these are difficult policy questions, his model does
not seem to settle the matter.
174. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 103.
175. Id.
176. Indeed, a point rarely written about, but one that Scott must heed, is that, in
all Article 9 drafts prior to 1956, the 10-day grace period was applicable to both in-
ventory and non-inventory PMSIs. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 29.5, at 799 (1965). Therefore, questioning whether the Code's
treatment of purchase money lenders has unproved over time may lead to widely
divergent assertions.
177. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1835 ("Here, the Study Group recommendations
work to enhance the favorable position granted to general financing creditors by
expanding their ability to maintain their first-m-time priority in proceeds.").
178. Answers to most questions about the behavior of the secured credit system are
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What is important to know about the current scope of the
term "proceeds" under section 9-306 is that it has a transaction-
al focus. The secured party obtains a security interest in any-
thing received upon the "sale, exchange, collection or other dis-
position of' the collateral. 179 Accordingly, courts have taken the
position that the debtor must have transferred title to the collat-
eral before an asset can be classified as proceeds of that collat-
eral. 1O This requirement has led to a series of decisions that
have demed proceeds status to such items as lease pay-
ments, 8' cash dividends,"2  and various kinds of farm
subsidies.' 3
inherently statistical. For this reason, the evidence that this Article adds to the
debate permits only the loosest and weakest of inferences about the matters that the
Authors are trying to understand. Yet illuminating the unknowns in the system can
aid in the development of a research agenda for obtaining the good and complete
data needed.
179. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1994).
180. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E]ach of the fore-
going events describes an event whereby one asset is disposed of and another is
acquired as its substitute.").
181. See, e.g., In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1991); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Cleary Bros. Constr. Co. (In re Cleary
Bros. Constr. Co.), 9 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). But see Investment Hotel
Properties, Ltd. v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Investment Hotel Prop-
erties, Ltd.), 109 B.R. 990 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding that payment for the use
of hotel rooms is proceeds); John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Southern Equip. Sales
Co. (In re Southern Equip. Sales Co.), 24 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (holding
that the term "proceeds" includes rents). The Permanent Editorial Board for the
UCC has taken the position that the right to receive rentals is proceeds.
Where a debtor has granted to a secured party a security interest in
goods that the debtor later leases as lessor, the lease rentals would con-
stitute proceeds of the secured party's collateral for the reason that the
debtor's conveyance of a leasehold interest in the goods constitutes a
disposition of the goods for purposes of § 9-306(1).
PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY No. 9,
FINAL DRAFT, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at 1 (June 5, 1992).
182. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042. Courts have drawn a distinction between
an ordinary cash dividend and a liquidating dividend. The latter would seem to be
proceeds. See, e.g., Aycock v. Texas Commerce Bank, NA., 127 B.R. 17 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1991).
183. Most of the cases in this area have involved the federal payment-m-kind (PIK)
program. Under this program, a farmer agrees not to grow crops on a certain per-
centage of Is land and receives, in exchange for that promise, a governmental pay-
ment in kind of the foregone crops. See In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561, 561-62 (8th
Cir. 1984). The question is whether the PIK payment or payments under similar
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The Final Report proposes a dual conception of proceeds that
would encompass all varieties of assets. First, the Code would
address the "exchange and replacement" cases.' Proceeds
would include anything "received in place of and in substitution
for the original collateral, which has been disposed of or reduced
in value (such as by collections)."'" Under this standard, the
secured party presumably would have a claim to lease rentals
and to the debtor's tort and warranty claims." 6 The second
category of cases are the "close association" cases. 8 ' These sit-
uations would involve "all forms of distributions on account of
securities, partnership interests, government subsidies, and
other payments that do not involve an 'exchange."" The
Study Group would treat these receipts as proceeds because
they are "so necessarily and obviously associated with an inter-
est in the original collateral that a security agreement and
financing statement ought not to be required to mention them
explicitly 2,189
Within this area, Scott's argument that general financing
creditors dominate the Article 9 revision process has some initial
plausibility Adoption of the Study Group recommendations and
the resulting expansion of the conception of proceeds surely will
redound to the benefit of some general financiers and will, as
Scott suggests, have some impact on the integrity of the filing
system."9 As this Article has indicated, however, the recom-
mendations can be meaningless or misleading if examined with-
out reference to context. Scott has taken in too little of the pic-
programs are proceeds of the crop that never existed. Most courts have held that it
is not. See, e.g., In re Kingsley, 865 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Binning, 45 B.R.
9 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
184. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 110-11.
185. Id. at 110.
186. Id. Although a tort claim nght qualify as proceeds under section 9-306(1), it
currently could not be the subject of a valid security interest because Article 9 ex-
cludes tort claims. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1994). The Study Group has suggested that
Article 9 include "security interests in clamis (other than claims for personal injury)
arsing out of tort, to the extent that such claims are assignable under applicable
non-UCC law." FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 58.
187. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 111.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Scott, supra note 4, at 1836-37.
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ture. To understand the system better, one should consider the
following:
1. The Study Group did not go as far as it might have. For ex-
ample, the Final Report rejects the idea that a construction
contractor's accounts might be proceeds of the construction
equipment used on the job.'9 ' At least one commentator has
criticized this position as "placing a formalistic and commercially
unjustified limitation upon the scope of the term 'proceeds.""92
2. Disaggregation of the reported cases into subcategories re-
veals that the typical proceeds claimant is not the powerful
general financier envisioned by Scott but rather a PMSI or inex-
perienced creditor who failed to describe the proceeds in the
security agreement and financing statement.'93
3. Along with the suggested reconceptualization of the term
"proceeds" are proposals that would confirm and arguably en-
large the protection now afforded to third parties who acquire
cash proceeds.'94
191. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 111 n.16 ("At some point, the acquisition of
assets by a debtor, in part as a result of a diminution in value of collateral, will be
too attenuated for those assets to be considered proceeds.").
192. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and
Revision of the U.C.C. Section 9-306, 69 TUL. L. REV. 645, 701 (1995) (emphasis
added).
193. See, e.g., In re Tri-State Equip., Inc., 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986); Appliance
Buyers Credit Corp. v. Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc. (In re Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc.),
38 B.R. 284 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Territo (In re Territo),
32 B.R. 377 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Rogers, 6 B.R. 472 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Boston, 564 P.2d 964 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). If the court
does not characterize a subsequently acquired asset as proceeds, it will nevertheless
be subject to the creditor's security interest if the security agreement adequately de-
scribes it. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1994) (permitting a security agreement to provide
for a security interest in after-acquired collateral). Consider, for example, PIK pay-
ments. If a secured party described this property along with the anticipated crops to
be grown, the proceeds issue would never arise. Indeed, even in those instances m
which the proceeds are outside the scope of Article 9, a secured party can usually
acquire an interest in the item by some other means. For example, a common-law
assignment of a tort claim may be effective.
194. Courts often apply common-law rules of negotiability to protect good faith
purchasers of cash proceeds. See, e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Cullen (In re
Antinarelli Enters., Inc.), 94 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). Official Comment 2(c)
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4. A statutory expansion of the definition of the term "proceeds"
might, in some cases, directly benefit unsecured creditors. For
example, a Maine statute provides that a judicial lien can reach
the proceeds of a debtor's property only if a secured party would
be able to reach those same proceeds under section 9-306.'
The preceding sampler should convey the flavor of the prob-
lem. Without accurate pictures of the factual underpinnings,
debates about the Article 9 revision process cannot proceed
usefully
to current § 9-306 reads:
Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking account
and paid out in the operation of the debtors business, recipients of the
funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may have
in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and trans-
fers in ordinary course.
U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2(c); see also PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, PEB COMMENTARIES 1-7, FINAL DRAFT, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at 33
(Mar. 10, 1990) (discussing the relative priorities of security interests in the cash
proceeds of accounts). The Study Group would delete the "ordinary course" limitation
in the comment and revise it to "make clear that a good faith purchaser for value of
cash proceeds or of funds from a deposit account containing cash proceeds cuts off a
security interest in the cash proceeds to the extent that the purchaser would take
free of other claims to the property." FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 121-22.
Although the foregoing recommendation may be simply a restatement of current
law, a companion recommendation may have the effect of changing it, to the prej-
udice of the primary lender. One common effort in recent years has been to find a
consequence-oriented approach for resolving postdefault conflicts between competing
security interests. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne et al., Junior Creditors' Realization on
Debtors' Equity Under U.C.C. Section 9-311: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1905 (1989). Although Article 9 explicitly envisions the existence of junior secu-
rity interests in collateral, see U.C.C. § 9-504(3), it presently is silent on many of
the issues raised in connection with the junior creditor's enforcement. One topic that
has generated extensive discussion concerns the junior creditor's right to retain pro-
ceeds arsmg from the disposition of collateral under § 9-504 or collections from ac-
count debtors and other obligors under § 9-502. The Study Group has proposed that
the junior creditor has no obligation to apply the proceeds of collection or other
disposition to a debt secured by a senior lien on the collateral. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 113, at 216-22. Although general principles of negotiability might justify this
rule change, it may have a profound impact on developing case law. See, e.g., Con-
solidated Equip. Sales, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 627 P.2d 432 (Okla.
1981) (finding that a junior secured party has an obligation to turn proceeds of the
sale of the collateral over to the senior secured party).
195. See New England Mortgage Servs. Co. v. Petit, 590 A.2d 1054 (Me. 1991) (ap-
plying ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3131(9) (West Supp. 1990)).
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V CONCLUSION
As the foregoing argument demonstrates, the Authors are
uneasy with metatheory that reduces complex human interac-
tion to the head of a pin. Any assertion of the inadequacies of
the commercial lawmaking process is inappropriate without
considering the realities of that process and without coing to
terms with the jurisprudential foundations that inform the Uni-
form Commercial Code. This inquiry has revealed the impreci-
sion of Scott's conclusions and has suggested that his under-
standing of the competing interests in the Article 9 filing regime
is, at best, incomplete.
The greatest benefit of theories like the one proposed by Scott
is that they remind us of the extent to which thinking about
commercial law is dependent upon empirically validated models
of the lawmaking process. 9 ' The absence of a reliable model of
the behavior of the legislative system leaves us in a poor posi-
tion to evaluate reconsiderations of that system. Even if all
agreed on the values and goals of commercial law, no sound
basis exists for concluding that abandoning the current system,
finding ways to make that system more efficient, or retaimng
the current system would make the attainment of those goals
more likely
196. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 336 (1989) ("To advocate law reforms without a
shred of evidence about how the system currently works, who is likely to be affect-
ed, and how those effects may reverberate throughout the system is breathtakingly
negligent.").
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